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mained in California and later moved to Minnesota where the proceedings for extradition were initiated. The court stated that it could
not be claimed that the obligor had committed in New York or any
third state an act which intentionally resulted in a crime in the state
of Minnesota. The obligor had never been present in Minnesota and
the court of Minnesota had no jurisdiction over the person of the
obligor. Extradition could not be properly granted by the responding
state because it could not be said that the obligor committed any crime
in the demanding state.
West Virginia has adopted the Uniform Extradition Act and the
Uniform Support Act with little variation from those proposed by the
commissioners. The Uniform Extradition Act which was enacted
in 1937 is now W. VA. CODE ch. 5, art. 1, §§ 7-13 (Michie 1961).
The Uniform Support Act which was enacted in 1950 is now W. VA.
CODE ch 48, art. 9, §§ 1-20 (Michie 1961).
The court in the instant case based refusal of extradition on lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the obligor. The court reasoned
that neither the Uniform Extradition Act nor the Uniform Support
Act gave the Massachusetts court jurisdiction. Section 6 of the
Uniform Extradition Act did not apply because Massachusetts could
not, by a legislative act, impose an obligation to support an illegitimate
child in Massachusetts and could not impose criminal liability for
failure to support such a child where the alleged father had never been
within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. The act of non-support was
not sufficient to give the demanding state jurisdiction. Further, the
Uniform Support Act did not give Massachusetts jurisdiction over
the person of the obligor because during the period for which support
was sought the obligor was not present within Massachusetts and no
obligation to support could arise under its laws. Thus the majority
opinion in the instant case appears to best protect the rights of the
individual obligor.
FredAdkins

Marshaling Claims---The Effect Of State Exemption Laws
On Collection Of Government Liens
P was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy insuring the life of
X. This policy had a cash surrender value of 27,285.87 dollars, and
a face value of 50,000 dollars. B, bank, had a senior lien on the
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policy by way of a pledge from X. G, the federal goverment, had a
junior lien on the cash surrender value. P paid B 26,844.66 dollars,
claiming that the cash surrender value was reduced by this amount,
and that G could only reach the remainder of the cash surrender value.
G claimed that B should first satisfy its claim from the proceeds,
leaving the cash surrender value for G. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed a judgment that allowed marshaling. Held,
reversed. The state law exempts from levy of creditors the proceeds
of a life insurance policy. Therefore, it would be inequitable to
marshal the claims so as to reduce the proceeds to the injury of the
beneficiary. Meyer v. United States, 84 Sup. Ct. 318 (1963).
In the principal case the parties did not dispute that: the unpaid
federal income tax created a lien on the taxpayer's property and
rights to property as provided under section 3670 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, and without such a lien the government
would not have any right to the proceeds of the life insurance policy,
Commissioner v. Sterm, 357 U.S. 39 (1958); the insured taxpayer's
property and right to property is determined by state law, United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); the cash surrender value of an
insurance policy, where subject to the control of the taxpayer, is
property and rights to property, United States v. Bess, supra; finally,
the priority of liens is determined by the principle of first in time is
first in right, United States v. New Britian, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
The issue involved in this discussion is founded on the doctrine
of marshaling. This doctrine says that where there are two creditors,
one senior and the other junior with the senior having a right to
collect from two of the same creditor's funds while only one of these
is available to the junior creditor, the senior encumbrancer must first
satisfy his claim from the fund not doubly charged. 35 AM. JUR.
MarshalingAssets and Securities § 2 (1941).
Like any other general rule it has exceptions. For example, equity
will not marshal assets to the injury of a third person having an equal
equity. Birch River Boom and Lumber Co. v. Glendon Boom and
Lumber Co., 71 W. Va. 139, 76 S.E. 167 (1912).
All states have exemption statutes. These exemption laws create
new equities based on public policy that prevents creditors from
reaching certain property. Because of the creation of these equities
there has developed a well recognized exception to the rule of marshaling. Basically it is that if a creditor has a claim against exempt
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property and also against other property, a junior creditor cannot
compel the senior creditor to resort first to the exempt property for
payment. Annot., 77 A.L.R. 371 (1932); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 758
(1926).
The basis for such a rule is that when the state creates an exemption law they are giving to the beneficiary of this law new equities
and protections equal to those given to the creditors. They are saying
that it is just as important to preserve exempt property as it is to allow
a creditor to collect his claim. Because the equities are equal, equity
will not allow marshaling. In re Bailey, 176 Fed. 990 (8th Cir.
1910); Sims v. McFadden, 127 Ark. 810, 233 S.W.2d 375 (1950).
West Virginia, like New York in the principal case, has a statute
creating a new equity in the beneficiary of life insurance. Our statute
provides that if a policy of insurance is effected by any person on his
own life or on another life, in favor of a person other than himself, the lawful beneficiary or assignee shall be entitled to its proceeds
and prevails against the creditors and representatives of the insured,
whether or not the right to change the beneficiary is reserved or
permitted. W. VA. CoDE ch. 33, art. 6, § 27 (Michie 1961).
The effect of these exemption statutes is to change the state procedure governing claim enforcement by changing the marshaling rule.
They affect the system of collection and not the right of the government to attach. The state law can not prevent a federal lien from
attaching to the property of the taxpayer, but the state does have
the right to change its collection procedure. United States v. Bess,
supra. The lien still attaches. The rules for collection are the ones
changed. Exemption statutes affect the rights of all state creditors,
including the federal government if they choose to use them.
The objection raised by the dissent is that the majority is allowing
the state exemption law to create a new equity for the people of their
state to the detriment of the federal government. In United States
v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1956), and United States v.
Winters, 312 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1961), the courts under similar fact
situations as are presented in the principal case simply stated that
the funds should be marshaled and that it would not be inequitable
to do so. They ignored the equity created by the state law, and indicated that to recognize this equity would be inequitable to the
federal government.
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Certainly the exemption statute is no more inequitable to the
federal government than any other statute the state might pass
changing the enforcement procedures for creditors' claims.
In United States v. Bosman, 363 U.S. 237 (1960) the Supreme
Court gave recognition to the fact that Congress has not provided
a system to supplement or replace the state procedure governing
claim enforcement, and that until they do the system provided by the
state is the most desirable to follow. This has always been the
general rule. Therefore, if you look to the state system of collection
you will be under the same rules that apply to the rest of the state
creditors in this regard.
As long as the federal government is looking to the state law to
determine priorities and rights of creditors, once their claim has attached, the holding of the principal case must follow. West Virginia,
having created an equity by providing for the beneficiary an exemption
of certain insurance proceeds, must be considered one of the states
that comes within the law stated by the Supreme Court in the
principal case.
Boyd Lee Warner, II

Property-Joint Tenancy in Joint Bank Accounts
P, the committee for W, an incompetent, sought to recover money
representing the proceeds of two bank accounts alleged to be wrongfully withheld by D. W's husband, H, had opened an account in the
name of H and W "payable to either or the survivor." H subsequently
closed this account and opened a new one in the name of H and D, H's
son. H died shortly thereafter. The lower court dismissed the proceeding and P appealed. Held, reversed, new trial granted. The withdrawal was held not to have destroyed the joint tenancy. The court
held that evidence would have to be introduced to determine whether
or not the presumption created by the statute that a joint tenancy
was intended was rebutted. If not, W would be entitled to her moiety
of the account (one half) or to all of the account if the proof
established that the closing of the account was not voluntarily and
understandingly made by H, i.e., that fraud, undue influence, or lack
of mental capacity resulted in H's closing the account. Bricker v.
Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d 22, 241 N.Y.S. 2d 413, 191 N.E.2d 795 (1963).
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